• “Consider the use of smart cards ... for especially critical functions.  Although more costly than software, when properly implemented the assurance gain is great.  The form-factor is not as important as the existence of an isolated processor and address space for assured operations – an ‘Island of Security,’ if you will.  Such devices can communicate with each other through secure protocols and provide a web of security connecting secure nodes located across a sea of insecurity in the global net.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

    Read more...
  • “The time needed to factor an RSA integer is the same order as the time needed to use that same integer as modulus for a single RSA encryption.   In other words, it takes no more time to break RSA on a quantum computer (up to a multiplicative constant) than to use it legitimately on a classical computer.”

    Professor Gilles Brassard,  "Quantum Information Processing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", 1997

    Read more...
  • “Never underestimate the attention, risk, money and time that an opponent will put into reading traffic.”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

    Read more...
Home Resources Frequently asked questions Quantum Cryptanalysis
Quantum Cryptanalysis

Facts and frequently asked questions about quantum algorithms and their conjectured impact on modern cryptographic security systems.

Title Filter     Display # 
# Article Title
1 fact: Code breaking quantum computers are a nightmare for existing security systems
2 faq: What is the timeline for code breaking quantum computers?
3 faq: What cryptographic primitives can achieve 80-bit post quantum security?
4 faq: How widely acknowledged is the threat of code breaking quantum computers?
 

Related Items