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“It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!”
Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995
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"Given their power to intercept and disrupt secret communications, it is not surprising that quantum computers have the attention of various U.S. government agencies. The National Security Agency, which supports research in quantum computing, candidly declares that given its interest in keeping U.S. government communications secure, it is loath to see quantum computers built. On the other hand, if they can be built, then it wants to have the first one.”
Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008 -
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“Consider the use of smart cards ... for especially critical functions. Although more costly than software, when properly implemented the assurance gain is great. The form-factor is not as important as the existence of an isolated processor and address space for assured operations – an ‘Island of Security,’ if you will. Such devices can communicate with each other through secure protocols and provide a web of security connecting secure nodes located across a sea of insecurity in the global net.”
Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

| Synaptic Group Key Exchange Home |
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Achieve end-to-end long term secure key-exchanges with Synaptic Labs' many-to-many key exchange technology. Ideal for roaming users over all conventional data networks, and the perfect companion to securing communication within hybrid quantum key distribution/Ethernet networks! Synaptic Labs' Group Key exchange is a high assurance key-exchange technology targeted for communications between 2 to ~250 hardware security modules (HSM). The HSM may be smart cards, network attached HSM, or any combination of the two. The choice of form factor can be adjusted to suit each group's requirements. In collaborative communications environments each member of the group is provided with a smart card that has been initialized within that group (see label 1). After the smart card has been initialised the key exchanges occur directly between the two smart cards (see label 2). The smart card is used to uniquely identify members of the group within that group and to perform all sensitive key exchange operations. Just like normal smart card security applications, each group member plugs the smart card into the computer from which they wish to securely communicate. In inter-company back office applications the Group Key Exchange may be used to secure a group of network servers belonging to different companies. The smart cards are used to enable secure network connections between the servers. Network attached hardware security modules provide the ideal platform for performing secure business computing. In this context all sensitive data operations and business logic is run within a hardened computing environment. The Group Key Exchanges performs initial exchange of symmetric key material in an information theoretically secure manner (see label 1). These pre-shared secrets are then used in conservative post quantum secure key exchanges using NIST/FIPS 140 Authorised security functions (see label 2). Up to 50-to-100 year security can be optionally achieved through a combination of 512-bit key lengths and conservative symmetric operations. The Group Key Exchange is an ideal companion to existing and next generation QKD and QKD networks. 1) The Group Key Exchange is uniquely suitable for exchanging initial secrets, or replenishing initial secrets after a denial-of-service attack, for point to point QKD and within large QKD Networks. 2) The Group Key Exchange can ensure end-to-end post quantum security between users who may be communicating through Virtual Private Networks that use key material exchanged using QKD Networks. In this context end-users may be communicating with the VPN router over Ethernet or wireless Ethernet mediums. The GKX ensures that these users achieve a minimum of post quantum security in the advent of attacks performed within the local area network before they reach the protection of the QKD network. 3) The Group Key Exchange offers a layered defence model that protects against single point of trust failure which might compromise point to point QKD and QKD networks. Access to additional information in this category may be restricted from you. Information available under this user account is accessible via the menu bar on the right of the screen under the Group Key Exchange menu item.
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| Last Updated on Monday, 22 June 2009 15:21 |


